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Abstract:  
 
This research aims toward a better understanding of the organizational culture(s) of the judiciary in Switzerland by 
analysing what ‘good justice’ means nowadays in this country. It seeks to clarify whether, and to what extent, 
expectations of ‘good justice’ of judicial actors (judges without managerial experience) and of managerial actors (court 
managers) are similar and to describe possible managerial implications that may result from this. As judges are at the 
heart of the judicial organization and exert a strong influence on other groups of actors (Sullivan, Warren et al. 1994), the 
congruence of their expectations with those of court managers will be at the centre of the analysis. Additionally, referring 
to the conceptual worlds of Boltanski and Thévenaut (1991), we analyze how closely these expectations are to 
management-oriented values. We found that almost half of expectations are common to the two groups examined and 
the main quoted ones are compatible to new public management (NPM) concepts. On the other hand, those 
expectations shared exclusively by judges relate to the human side of justice, whereas those specific to court managers 
focus on the way justice functions. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, organizations within the judicial branch are targets for modernization strategies inspired by the NPM. The new 
public management (NPM) movement started in the Anglo-Saxon world in the 1970s prior to spreading elsewhere. Its 
main claim is the superiority of private-sector managerial techniques over those of the more traditional public 
administration (Osborne 2006).  
 
Its strategies, which consider justice systems as any other public service (Boillat and Leyenberger 2008), do not contest a 
basic principle of the third power—that judges are constitutionally independent and must be able to work free from any 
source of influence (Klopfer 2007; Langbroek 2008). However, courts and tribunals are organizations which must be 
properly managed in order to improve their efficiency, their efficacy and their accountability (Lienhard 2009), as well as the 
quality of justice and its ‘customer’ orientation. In this regard, management should have a supportive role in the courts to 
enhance justice quality as there would be no ‘good justice’ without good management of the tribunals. Judicial and 
organizational work are entangled and the organizational side of the court can guarantee judicial work only if judges are 
involved in it. According to Mattijs (2006), judges must assume some administrative tasks in both the organic and 
functional sense but a cultural shock for magistrates is deemed necessary for that to happen. If not, the disconnection 
between the administrative and judicial worlds may lead to profound misunderstandings between judges and court 
managers. 
 
In practice, however, the proper interaction between judicial work and court management seems far more complex than 
expected (Lienhard and Bolz 2001; Amrani-Mekki 2008; Vauchez 2008). The problem comes from an inevitable conflict 
between goals, values and functions of each group (Cameron, Zimmermann et al. 1987; Langbroek 2008).  
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As judges are at the heart of the judicial organization and exert a strong influence on other groups of actors (Sullivan, 
Warren et al. 1994), the congruence of their expectations with those of court managers will be at the centre of our 
analysis, which focuses on the following research questions:  
 What are the divergences and convergences when it comes to the expectations of ‘good justice’ according to 
judges without managerial responsibilities and court managers? 
 How do these expectations fit with management-oriented values? 
 
2. Theoretical Background and Review of the Literature  
 
2.1 The Judiciary and (New) Public Management (NPM) 
All public organizations are accountable to the citizens and governments for the way that they spend their money 
(Langbroek 2005). NPM techniques are aimed at rendering public institutions more efficient and thus, more valuable for 
the population (so-called ‘value for money’) and consequently are supposed to help politicians achieve good management 
of public resources by enhancing the legitimacy of public institutions. Not surprisingly, as NPM is the son of two opposites, 
namely the new institutional economics and the business-type managerialism (Hood, 1991), it created lively debates in 
both research and practice. As for its methods, Hood (1991) defines seven doctrinal components: professional 
management in the public sector, the use of measures and standards of performance, emphasis on outputs, 
disaggregation of units, greater competition, stress on private-sector styles and on greater discipline and parsimony in 
resource use. Others emphasise the centrality of quantitative measurement together with notions such as efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy. When applied to the judiciary, this led the chief justice of New South Wales to declare that, 
‘there is clearly a trade-off between efficiency and expedition on the one hand, and fair procedures on the other hand’ 
(Spigelman 2001), p. 7.  
 
This turns out to be valid as the quality of a judicial norm, a trial and a judgement can’t be differentiated from the quality of 
their elaboration process and thus, from a good organization of the judiciary (Pauliat 2007; Cadiet 2011). As a 
consequence, separating the management of courts from the politics of the judiciary would be hardly possible (Pauliat 
2005; Kirat 2010), underpinning that judges and court administrators work closely together to improve the quality of the 
courts.  
 
Nevertheless, the generalization of NPM is far from evident as ‘different administrative values have different implications 
for fundamental aspects of administrative design’ (Hood 1991), p. 9, which means the particularities of each organization 
have to be accounted for. Overall, what Hamel calls the managerial model (Hamel 2011) can’t be imported as a one size 
fits all but has to be tailored in order to fit with the mission and the culture of the targeted organization. As explained 
below, this argument is particularly important for the judiciary, an institution with a strong professional and administrative 
culture mainly inspired by traditional public administration values such as legality, equality, objectivity, impartiality and 
general interest (see 2.2). NPM encountered many problems when applied to the judiciary in general and to judges in 
particular. For instance, evaluation standards and indicators are more than instruments because they reflect what is 
deemed important and valuable for the internal actors of the tribunal. These values, expectations and quality criteria have 
to be accepted by judges and can’t be imposed from management but by professional experts who are accustomed to the 
organization of the judiciary and the aspirations of stakeholders (Böttcher 2004; Langbroek 2005). Even those in favour of 
the introduction of managerial techniques in the judiciary believe that indicators must be chosen with great care and their 
pertinence should be unanimously recognized in order to be accepted by all (Vicentini 2011).  
 
The underestimated cultural dimension of NPM explains at least partly the difficulties encountered by its implementation in 
the judiciary (Lienhard 2009), as it can be considered a cultural project (Schedler and Proeller 2007; Bezes 2008) which 
may fail to consider some central principles of the justice system, such as freedom and equality (Frydman 2011). Values 
such as efficiency, efficacy, productivity, customer-orientation, or even return on investment are far from being prevalent 
in the judiciary and may lead to a cultural shock or even an identity crisis, as is the case in other administrative contexts 
(Giauque and Emery 2008; Rondeaux 2011).  
 
Since managerial knowledge is usually not present in the judiciary, there is also the danger to render magistrates more 
dependent to court administrators (Schmetz 2006). In many ways, it is very important to determine a commonly accepted 
definition of an efficient court and in a broader sense, of ‘good justice’ (Wipfli 2006). 
 
2.2. What Do We Know About the Culture of the Judiciary? 
 
2.2.1. General Concepts and Determinants of ‘Culture’  
Organizational culture can be defined as ‘a patterned system of perceptions, meanings, and beliefs about the organization 
which facilitates sense-making amongst a group of people sharing common experiences and guides individual behaviour 
  
 
International Journal For Court Administration  |  June 2014  3  
 
 
at work’ (Bloor and Dawson 1994), p. 276. Put differently, culture is central to the understanding of any organization’s 
functioning.  
 
The determinants of culture are manifold and there is usually no uniform culture in one organization but a mosaic of (sub-
)cultures (Matz, Adams et al. 2011). During the seventies and eighties, scholars pointed out the importance of the national 
level (Hofstede 1980) as well as the organizational level through the concept of organizational or corporate culture (Deal 
and Kennedy 1982; Schein 1990). More recently, Bouckaert classifies culture from a public administration point of view in 
four categories: macro (civilisation, place and structure), meso (professional administration), micro (organizational level) 
and nano (offices, job clusters) (Bouckaert 2007). Others put the emphasis on several levels and describe administrative 
culture as an aggregate of various elements such as social values, economic and political cultures and other sources of 
influence (Dwivedi and Gow 1999). Institutions (as the judiciary) strongly contribute to shaping the culture of any 
organization (as courts), as they represent a continuous sociological interaction process between actors who enact the 
values, norms and objectives related to their mission (DiMaggio 1991; Bloor and Dawson 1994; Hall and Taylor 1996).  
 
2.2.2. Focusing on Judicial Culture  
There is little knowledge about culture within the justice system. Comparative research has been done in several 
countries (Bell 2006; Vigour 2006), and also focused on specific (court) organizations (Ostrom, Hanson et al. 2005). Most 
of them try to explain the link between court culture and performance (Ostrom, Ostrom et al. 2007; Matz, Adams et al. 
2011), therefore considering culture an antecedent of court performance. 
 
Previous studies researching the culture of the judiciary analyzed the relationships between internal actors of courts 
(lawyers, judges, attorney, parties etc.) but rarely included external stakeholders (media, citizens etc.). Even though 
Eisenstein and Flemming mention the idea of a national culture and common values, the core of their research is on 
county legal culture which they define as the values and perceptions of the principal members of the court community 
about how they are expected to act and how they believe they act in reality when performing their tasks (Eisenstein, 
Flemming et al. 1988). Furthermore, others only consider informal relations between judges, lawyers, defence attorneys 
and prosecutors in their research (Church, Carlson et al. 1978). More recently, some authors focused their 
conceptualisation of court culture on the importance of cooperation and coordination between judges, prosecutors and 
defence attorneys in the efficient resolution of criminal affairs (Ostrom, Hanson et al. 1999). This is probably related to the 
belief that getting the consent of internal stakeholders is more relevant than the one of others (Langbroek 2005). What 
Church (1985) calls the local legal culture is this mix of attitudes and practices which influence, among others, the pace of 
litigation and corresponds to Bouckaert’s meso and micro levels. In this regard, the cultural dimension of courts is crucial 
as it is one of the key factors linked to a successful implementation of managerial values and methods into the judiciary 
and most of the time, those in charge of introducing changes within tribunals are precisely court administrators. Burke and 
Broccolina (2005) try to integrate both approaches, saying that court culture as defined by Ostrom (2005) is 
complementary to local legal culture discovered by Church (Church 1982; Church 1985).  
 
2.2.3. Judges and Court Managers 
It is interesting to note that professional standards of judges and managerial expectations of court administrators may 
contradict each other (Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd et al. 2005; Emery  and Giauque 2012; Fortier and Emery 2012), leading to 
possible value clashes. This is extremely important if we consider that judges, maybe more than any other public 
servants, have a very strong common identity as they are being educated as members of a group of remarkable 
professionals (Langbroek 2005). Expanding the influence of new role expectations from different internal (stakeholders) 
and external actors (e.g., politicians, citizens, lawyers, attorneys, clerical and managerial staff) that potentially conflict with 
judges’ professional ethos and their vision of ‘good justice’ may gradually transform the culture of the judiciary.  
 
Despite the fact that justice management is seen as being subordinated to the judiciary, management-related 
expectations of ‘good justice’ may have a non-negligible influence on it (Kirat 2010; Poltier 2012). When it comes to court 
administrators, if we except the study of Cameron and Zimmermann dated from the pre-NPM era (Cameron, Zimmermann 
et al. 1987), they are rarely considered as actors who influence court culture to our knowledge, although they are probably 
those with the best bird’s-eye view of court organization, practices and values.  
 
To the opposite, a flow of literature says that giving more managerial power to certain judges may lead to bad 
management and cause problems in terms of the independence of some judges towards those who consider the new 
management as nothing else than a sophisticated way to retain power (Jeuland 2011; Labrusse-Riou 2011). Legendre 
quoted in Jeuland (2011) even goes further arguing that management is in direct competition with the law. In all cases, the 
additional problem of the blurring frontiers between judicial and administrative duties has to be considered (Poltier 2012). 
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Some Authors put in opposition the efficiency of the tribunal and the institution itself, defending the idea that judicial life is 
now more focused on the former rather than on the way the organizations of the judiciary and the social relations within 
them function (Labrusse-Riou 2011).  
 
Similarly Mattijs say that judges will try to please the chiefs of courts in one way or the other when their work is assessed 
on quantitative standards only (Mattijs 2006) and some drifts can consequently be expected (Piraux and Bernard 2006). 
Justice should therefore be managed in such a manner that other worlds, such as the economical one, don’t interfere with 
the judiciary (Rousseau 2011). If those spheres are mixed up, there is a risk that the use of the scarcity of resources’ 
concept would weaken the rational-legal foundation of the administrative bureaucracy, which guarantees judicial security 
(Serverin 2011).  
 
This may be the reason why judges tend to appoint court administrators who are ‘non-threatening individuals who will not 
actively seek reform or disturb the status quo’ (Berkson and Hays 1977), p. 87. More recently, the experience of a Belgian 
court sent a contradictory but nevertheless promising message. The relationship between the president of the court and 
the new human resources advisor went from the withdrawal of the former HR advisor, due to the lack of legitimacy of his 
position, to ‘the shared conviction of the complementarity of the two functions, which together with trust and mutual 
support, will lead to a true partnership for a common and shared construction’
2
 (Dewart and Leroy 2013), p. 22. 
Nonetheless, the introduction of NPM-like techniques may eventually lead to cultural resistance by further polarizing the 
relations between judges and court managers.  
 
 
3. Contextual background: NPM and Court Management in Switzerland 
The NPM movement appeared in the 90s in Switzerland as a reaction to the perceived weaknesses of public sector 
organizations (input-oriented, rules predominance etc.) and to the excessive political control of operative decisions 
(Schedler 2003; Lienhard, Ritz et al. 2005) with the aim of increasing the performance of public services and rendering 
them more efficient and effective (Emery  and Martin 2010). The Swiss context is rather receptive to private sector 
methods and values (Thom and Ritz 2013). The reforms conducted in the country include, among other things, the search 
for an increased efficiency, a decentralisation process, the flattening of hierarchies together with the introduction of 
market-type mechanisms (Schedler 2003).  
 
Nonetheless, the implementation of NPM programmes is happening at a much-reduced pace as compared to what was 
initially anticipated (Emery  and Giauque 2012). Many advocates of public sector reforms deeply underestimated the 
importance of administrative culture and the institutional dimension of reforms in Switzerland (Giauque 2013), considering 
NPM only as a set of managerial techniques. In that respect, it is not surprising that the judiciary has been one of the 
latest institutions to have experienced NPM (Wipfli 2006). Nevertheless, a culture shift seems to have happened in 
Switzerland’s court management practices. In the canton of Vaud, second instance judges (tribunal cantonal) failed to be 
elected by the political authority as they were believed to lack some of the required competences for the positions to be 
filled
3
 showing a shift toward skills rather than political affiliation and a traditional routinized election. The recent issues of 
an overloaded justice system in Fribourg brought court administration back into the spotlight.
4
 Finally, the management of 
the justice system in Geneva was heavily criticized by a recent report published by the Court of Auditors.
5
  
 
In Switzerland, a nascent literature exists when it comes to court management. It focuses on reforms from the perspective 
of constitutional and administrative law (Lienhard 2011; Poltier 2011), on organizational, structural and leadership aspects 
of the court (Wipfli 2006; Mosimann 2011; Poltier 2011), on the effects of the recent unification of Swiss procedural laws 
on the organization of the tribunals (Berne 2011) or on the implementation of NPM instruments into courts following the 
reorganization of judicial institutions (Berne 2011). Moreover, certain authors investigated the degree of autonomy 
required for court administration to guarantee the independence of the judiciary (Poltier 2012) or the way courts’ workload 
is managed (Lienhard and Kettiger 2009). Moral dilemmas and stress experienced by judges were also investigated by 
some scholars (Ludewig 2009), but we could not find publications comparing the expectations of judges and court 
managers in Switzerland.  
 
 
4. Methodology 
                                                 
2
 Freely translated from French by the authors.  
3
 http://www.arcinfo.ch/fr/suisse/vaud-les-candidats-au-tribunal-cantonal-tous-recales-566-1197103 [dernière consultation le 
28.06.2013] 
4
http://www.rts.ch/info/regions/fribourg/4980074-la-justice-fribourgeoise-fonctionne-bien-mais-est-surchargee.html [19.06.2013] 
5
 http://www.cdc-ge.ch/fr/Publications/Rapports-d-audit/2012.html (11.07.2013), report Nr.54. 
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This research is part of a larger study on the cultural aspects of the judiciary in Switzerland, which is itself performed 
under the umbrella of an extensive national research project on court management across the country.
6
 The larger study 
involved approximately 80 semi-structured interviews of which more than 70 have already taken place in seven cantons
7
 
in the three linguistic regions of the nation with both internal (judges, clerks, court managers, general secretaries, 
attorneys) and external actors (politicians, lawyers, journalists and researcher) of the tribunals.  
 
For the present paper, we analyzed 18 in-depth interviews lasting on average one hour. Court managers and judges 
without any managerial experience from ten Swiss courts in the three linguistic parts of the country were questioned 
according to the inductive methodology (Strauss and Corbin 2004) to obtain an overview of the main expectations related 
to a ‘good justice’, until saturation appeared.
8
 During the interviews, respondents described and defined the qualities 
required for ‘good justice’ and whether they think there is a plurality of role expectations from the main stakeholders to be  
considered.  
 
Due to the relatively small number of interviews taken into account, we decided not to disaggregate the results according 
to the characteristics of the respondent or the courts in which he works. We will perform this in the next phase of the 
research when data will be analyzed with a more quantitative approach. At this point, we will also investigate the values 
underlying the expectations found in the present work.  
 
The audio recordings were transcribed and coded with the NVivo 10 software in order to identify the main expectations 
that came out of the statements of participants. Subsequently, we classified interview sections (phrases or entire 
paragraphs) in 27 different ‘knots’. Each knot corresponds to one argument that was individualized as important for ‘good 
justice’ by a respondent. Some expectations formulated by one participant can be competing or complementary, as the 
interviewees were asked to describe how ‘good justice’ should be according to them first, and then what they believed 
these expectations were for the other stakeholders. An interviewee could obviously mention several arguments, but one 
argument mentioned several times by the same respondent was counted only once. We eventually put the knots in an 
order according to the amount of respondents who mentioned each argument. Since the amount of interviews was 
somehow modest, we believed that a classification in three different groups of frequency (see Table 2) was sufficient.  
 
We must add that the interviewees did not necessarily mention the exact term as such, but we coded similar ideas in the 
same ‘knot’. Afterwards, we formulated a definition of the term inspired by the citations of the participants.
9
 Finally, we are 
aware that some expectations are very similar and could be potentially combined but we refrained from doing so as we 
wanted to analyze the discourse of the interviewees as subtly as possible. In the next phase of the research, a 
quantitative methodology using factory analysis will allow us to identify similar and competing values. 
 
In order to analyze the management-orientation of these expectations, we used the theoretical approach developed by 
Boltanski and Thévenot (1991)
10
 who classified the reference worlds to which people relate when they justify their actions 
in collective contexts. Their typology is made of ideal-type reference worlds (civic, commercial/business, domestic, 
industrial and others, see below), inspired by political philosophies that have marked history (Giauque 2004). NPM-
inspired reforms have been analyzed by several scholars using this metodology as a direct confrontation between the 
civic world (the classical Weberian administration) and the commercial/business world, the latter being supported by 
management initiatives (Giauque and Caron 2005; Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006; Rondeaux 2011). This kind of 
classification will help us determine the spheres of legitimisation to which judges and court managers appeal when they 
define what ‘good justice’ means for them and whether those are similar or not. Additionally, this will allow us to discover 
how our results relate to previous analogous studies in the public sector. 
  
More practically, we performed a review of comparable studies before brainstorming among the members of the research 
team to finally allocate the expectations in the various universes following the methodology of Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1991). 
 
 
                                                 
6
 See : www.justizforschung.ch 
7
 Fribourg, Vaud, Luzern, Valais, Jura, Neuchâtel, Ticino 
8
 This means that interviews were stopped when no new arguments were put forward by the interviewee. 
9
 For example, if a judge said “good justice has to be quick” and another explained that “celerity is the most important parameter for the 
users of justice” we would classify both sentences under the knot “fast”. 
10
 See also the English translation : BOLTANSKI, L., THEVENOT L., 2006, On justification : Economies of Worth, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press 
  
 
International Journal For Court Administration  |  June 2014  6  
 
 
 Industrial world Civic world Commercial/ 
Business world 
Domestic world 
Higher 
common 
principle 
Efficiency and 
‘functional‘ 
performance 
Representative 
collective bodies 
Competition and 
market value 
Personal 
relationships, 
hierarchy, tradition 
 
Succinct 
presentation 
of each 
world 
Inspired by 
machines, the 
industrial world 
places functional 
performance, 
professionalism, 
appropriate 
action and 
perfecting 
resources at the 
heart of its 
legitimacy 
Expression of 
democratic action, 
legitimised by 
legislation, the civic 
world is based on 
the emblematic 
figure of the citizen 
Devoted to the 
market, competition 
mechanisms 
surrounding 
potential ‘clients‘ 
and profitability are 
the central themes 
of the commercial 
world 
Inspired by the 
family, the domestic 
world reflect 
benevolent 
relationships that 
animate a collective 
entity, a milieu, a 
community 
Typical 
organization
al form 
Plant Public sector 
organization 
Enterprise Tribe 
Table 1: Main reference worlds by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) 
Management-oriented values are obviously related to the industrial and commercial worlds, the industrial one 
referring to the more classical ‘Taylorist’ approach while the commercial universe has more to do with NPM-
inspired techniques.  
 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
The following Table 2 gives an overview of the main expectations mentioned by our interviewees, classified by decreasing 
frequency: 
+++ : frequently mentioned (by at least two-thirds of the interviewees) 
++ : mentioned sometimes (by more than 1/4 of the interviewees) 
+ : mentioned by one or two interviewees 
 
 
  
Main expectations related to good justice  
Expectations 
of judges 
Expectations 
of court 
managers 
1 Fast  
Justice must solve problems as fast as possible in order to avoid 
troubles to the parties due to lengthy procedures. This is what people 
call the « celerity » of justice. 
+++ 
 
+++ 
2 Client-oriented  
Justice is a public service whose aim is to satisfy the needs of the 
citizens. 
+++ +++ 
3 Open to the public and the media 
Justice has to explain what she does to the public in a comprehensible 
manner via the media. 
++ +++ 
4 Independent 
Justice has to be independent from any kind of political pressure. 
++ ++ 
5 Transparent 
Justice must be transparent when it comes to the way it works. Hiding 
things to the citizens is not conceivable anymore. 
++ ++ 
6 Humane ++  
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Main expectations related to good justice  
Expectations 
of judges 
Expectations 
of court 
managers 
Justice is not simply the application of the law. It has to carefully take 
into account that its raw material is human beings and it may have 
heavy consequences on their lives. 
 
 
 
7 Close to the people 
Justice must be close to the citizens it serves. It must try to understand 
what the “man of street” lives when it deals with him. This is the idea of 
a “street-level” justice. 
++ + 
8 Personalised 
 Justice should consider as much as possible the particularities of 
every case and situation. It can’t apply a “one size fits all” solution to all 
cases. 
++  
9 Receptive 
Justice must be receptive to what the citizens expect from it. It must 
have its ear open and listen to the requirements addressed to it. 
++  
10 Fair 
Justice has to be fair both in the way it functions and in the manner it 
renders judgements. 
+  
11 Not too formalistic  
Justice shouldn’t be too fussy on the rules. It should apply a flexible 
system that allows to adapt procedures when necessary. 
+ + 
12 Non-jurists, lay people, render judgements 
Even the “lambda citizen” should be permitted to render justice as it 
represents the “will of the people” as much as jurists do. 
+ + 
13 Accountable  
Justice in its ivory tower is not accepted anymore. It is accountable 
towards society for both its judicial work and for the way it spends the 
money the State allocates to its functioning. 
+ ++ 
14 Respectful of the procedures 
Procedures must be closely followed in every situation. 
+ + 
15 Efficient  
Justice must use its resources with parsimony and take out the most of 
them. 
+ ++ 
16 Impartial  
Justice has to be freed from any kind of pressures from the parties. It 
has to judge everyone with the same lenses. 
+  
17 Look for arbitration 
Justice should try to reconcile the parties instead of favouring trials. 
+  
18 Global quality 
A good quality justice is paramount. Attributes such as fairness, 
celerity and impartiality are parts of it. 
+ + 
19 Treatment fairness  
Justice must treat all citizens in an equal mode. 
+  
20 Pragmatic 
A “smart” justice is needed. It has to adapt itself to the various 
situations it encounters in order to produce the best results. 
 ++ 
21 Close to people (geographically)  ++ 
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Main expectations related to good justice  
Expectations 
of judges 
Expectations 
of court 
managers 
Courts should be located as closely to people as possible. 
22 Efficacy 
Justice has to reach objectives and must be able to improve its 
effectiveness. 
 ++ 
23 Inspiring confidence  
The whole justice institution must inspire confidence and must be 
perceived as reliable by the citizens and parties. 
 ++ 
24 Easily accessible 
Access to justice must be easy, without any barriers. 
 + 
25 No corrupted 
Justice has to be free from any sort of corruption. 
 + 
26 Affordable (not too expensive) 
The cost related to any procedures must be as low as possible (for the 
parties) 
 + 
27 Solve all conflicts, all cases 
Justice should try to solve any kind of conflicts, should give a clear 
answer to all situations. 
 + 
Table 2: main expectations related to ‘good justice’, as quoted by judges and court managers  
 
 
5.1 Discussion 
A careful analysis of the transcripts showed the issue that is the most frequently (+++) quoted by judges as well as by 
court managers is the one of celerity (fast justice), followed by the notion of justice as a public service oriented towards 
clients. We then have a group of arguments mentioned by some interviewees (++) including: open to the public and the 
media, independent, and transparent. These five expectations were shared by our two groups of actors, and without 
considering the frequency of these expectations; about half of the expectations (12 out of 27) were common. Except for 
the issue of the independence of justice, which is the most frequently quoted when it comes to managerial initiatives 
within the judiciary (Lienhard 2009; Lienhard 2011), the four remaining items give a picture of a modern public service, 
customer-oriented and fast; a picture which would perfectly describe agencies managed according to NPM principles 
(Pollitt 2006). These features of good justice uncover a judicial culture which seems to be at least compatible with 
managerial values and initiatives. 
 
It is interesting to note that other judges’ expectations (++), not shared with court managers, focus more or less on the 
human side of justice (humane, personalised, receptive), whereas other court managers’ expectations not shared with 
judges are more or less related to an efficient functioning of justice (pragmatic, geographically close to people, efficacy, 
inspiring confidence). According to this second category of expectations, the managerial orientation seems to be 
supported by court managers rather than by judges, who support the humane side of justice. This argument, where 
judges expressed their apprehension against a strong focus on productivity through workload indicators, is frequently 
mentioned in the literature (Böttcher 2004).  
 
Finally the last group of statements used to define ‘good justice’ by judges (+), which don’t overlap with those of court 
managers, are the following: fair, impartial, look for arbitration, and treatment fairness. They are all related to the judicial 
core process which involves constitutional guarantees (Tophinke 2013) and are frequently incorporated in ethical codes. 
The same expectations for court managers are: easily accessible, not corrupted, financially affordable and solve all 
conflicts, which is a mix of different qualities of justice more or less customer-oriented (except not corrupted of course). In 
that sense, these first results are in line with other evaluations of NPM projects conducted in Switzerland, showing that 
customer-orientation is one of the main consequences of these reform initiatives (Ritz 2003; Giauque and Emery 2008). 
 
We will now focus on the classification of judges’ and court managers’ expectations according to the worlds of Boltanski 
and Thévenot (1991). 
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Table 3: Classification of judges’ and court managers’ expectations according to the worlds of Boltanski and 
Thévenot (1991) 
 
 
One would expect to find the civic world as the dominant one when it comes to ideas of ‘good justice’ as it is 
representative of collective bodies and is based on the figure of the citizen. These results are not in line with those of 
similar research conducted in Switzerland five years ago (Emery, Wyser et al. 2008): the dominant world was the 
industrial one, followed by the civic and the domestic world. It is therefore very interesting that the dominant worlds of 
reference from internal actors of the judiciary are civic and commercial, almost well-balanced. This hybrid culture is 
archetypical for what we call the post-bureaucratic environment (Emery 2013). According to Boltanski and Thévenot, the 
so-called conventions which may then be used by judges and court managers to sublimate the potential conflicts between 
these two logics will be decisive for a successful reform agenda in the judiciary. The same proposition is also expressed 
by many authors dealing with court culture, who emphasise the importance of a shared vision about what ‘good justice’ 
means (Langer 1994; Klein 2002) . 
 
Nonetheless, the expectations mentioned most frequently by judges and court managers (fast and client-oriented) relate 
respectively to the industrial and commercial worlds. This is significant if we consider that the majority of values 
embedded in NPM indeed relate to those worlds as well. This seems to confirm the idea of a new managerial logic 
invading the judiciary expressed earlier and gives interesting clues about the evolution of its culture. 
 
The other world that emerges in this analysis is the domestic one. In this universe, the main principle is based on personal 
relationships that animate a collective body. It is not by coincidence that this universe is the one where we find the 
majority of expectations from judges after the civic one, as the underlying image of a ‘caring justice’ has been mentioned 
by several judges. According to an experienced judge, ‘we should render justice without using any legal argument, without 
any judicial procedure…’, and just listening to humane feelings. This is probably an enduring feature of good justice 
supported by judges, which may notably impede management initiatives.  
 
 
6. Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research 
The way judges and court managers define ‘good justice’ is one of the central elements of a court culture, since it will 
have a strong impact on the particularities of the latter and will legitimate and influence judicial actors in the way they 
conduct their daily business. 
 
If we accept the idea that judges’ professional culture represents a part of their identity (Bouckaert 2007), we may 
suppose that the industrial and commercial worlds will be increasingly important for judges in the future compared to 
expectations focused on the civic universe. This suggests that classical values of the judiciary, inspired by the civic world, 
Industrial world Civic world Commercial 
(business) world 
Domestic world 
Fast Open to the public and 
the media 
Client-oriented Humane 
Industrial world Civic world Commercial 
(business) world 
Domestic world 
Efficient Independent Not too formalistic Close to the people 
Quality Transparent Close to people 
(geogr.) 
Look for arbitration 
 Fair Efficacy Inspiring confidence 
 Non-jurists render 
judgments 
Easily accessible  
 Accountable Financially affordable   
 Impartial Personalised  
 Respectful of the 
procedures 
Receptive  
 Treatment fairness Solve all conflicts all 
cases 
 
 Not corrupted   
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are going to be potentially colonized by more private sector-orientated expectations as the former would no longer be in 
total adequacy with the current society (Emery  and Giauque 2012).  
 
Additionally, as the impact of court organization on the reputation of the judiciary has been reinforced (Langbroek 2011), 
the importance of the industrial and commercial universes go without saying. Still, the importance of the civic world 
prevents governments from focusing only on the economical angle (Langbroek 2005). Moreover, the blurring boundaries 
between administration and judicial work (Poltier 2012), the presence of a public ethos which should guarantee that 
administrative acts are performed with embedded values such as equity, ethics and justice (du Gay 2009) and the 
reduced pace to which NPM programs are implemented in Switzerland may reconcile those three worlds and lead to a 
‘hybridized’ court culture. 
 
In this paper, we discovered that court managers and judges have relatively similar expectations when it comes to good 
justice, uncovering a relatively homogeneous court culture in Switzerland. Nevertheless, some non-surprising divergences 
have been noticed, with managers focusing more on the ‘economical’ angle of the judiciary while judges gave more 
importance to the judicial ‘core business’ of the institution. When it comes to management-oriented values, we found a 
judicial culture that seems at least not incompatible with the concepts coming with new public management, although the 
more traditional civic world which puts the citizen at the centre is still very present in the minds of judicial actors. When 
compared to other studies in the Swiss public administration, where the industrial world is dominant, it seems that the 
judiciary is a special case with its focus on the economical and civic worlds, leading to their rapid hybridization. Deeper 
studies are obviously needed to validate the hypothesis of a Swiss judicial culture somehow ‘isolated’ from those of other 
public administration services. 
 
At this stage of our research, some limitations must be considered. We analyzed possible differences between the 
expectations of professional judges without management responsibilities and those of court managers of the judiciary 
around the issue of ‘good justice’. This is only one aspect of the whole analysis planned in this research, and this paper 
alone does not pretend to uncover the underlying values of the judicial culture of Switzerland. The expectations and 
underlying values of other internal and external stakeholders will be considered in the next steps of the research to 
complete the analysis and to address the lack of court culture studies in Switzerland. In that perspective, the colonization 
process of management-oriented values may be even stronger than analyzed here. 
  
Another limitation is the representativeness of our sample. This was limited when it comes to the representation of judges 
and court managers in Switzerland, as we use an inductive approach. Nevertheless, we are confident that the sample is 
large and varied enough to faithfully depict the idea of ‘good justice’ among the categories of actors surveyed, because of 
an emerging qualitative saturation of arguments (Martineau 2005). It also goes without saying that having questioned 
judges and court managers only once due to time constraint. It would be valuable to compare the above mentioned 
results with others at a later point in time, in order to analyze the process of cultural change.  
 
To conclude, we believe that a macro-vision of the judicial institution is required to better understand its culture. This is the 
reason why, considering the reform agenda of the judiciary, we plead for the development of a new judicial governance, in 
the vein of new public governance proposed by Osborne (Osborne 2006), which would fully include the perspective of the 
various internal and external stakeholders and the complexity of today’s multi-networked public administration bodies, to 
further develop ‘good justice’ for citizens.  
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